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ABUSE OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT:
MYLAN’S ABILITY TO MONOPOLIZE
REFLECTS MAJOR WEAKNESSES
ABSTRACT
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
better known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, is intended to lower the average
price paid by consumers for prescription drugs. The Hatch-Waxman Act
attempts to do so by simplifying the application process for generic drug
manufacturers, allowing generic drug applications to circumvent the lengthy
FDA testing and approval process that brand-name manufacturers must
undergo. Though the Hatch-Waxman Act has successfully created a clear
path to the market for generic drugs, it contains loopholes that allow brand
name and generic companies to engage in practices aimed at maximizing
monopoly profits, effectively depriving consumers of a generic option. Some
of these practices include: reverse payments, citizen petitions, product
hopping, and the misclassification of drugs. This Note argues that
pharmaceutical companies have engaged in some of these practices and that
the Hatch-Waxman Act must be amended to prevent these companies from
continuing to circumvent the true intention of the Act.
INTRODUCTION
Mylan Pharmaceuticals, founded in 1961, is one of the “largest generics
and specialty pharmaceutical companies in the world, manufacturing and
marketing more than 2,700 different products to retail, wholesale,
governments and institutional customers.”1 Mylan is most well known for its
life-saving epinephrine auto-injectors, EpiPen and EpiPen Jr.—two
emergency medical devices that work to halt the deadly result of anaphylaxis
suffered by millions of patients throughout the United States.2 Currently, the
EpiPen, with a list price of over $600, is one of only two products on the
market available to these patients—patients whose medical coverage, copays, deductibles, and income vary greatly.3 Mylan makes billions of dollars
every year by selling drugs and medical devices throughout the country.4 But,
Mylan uses the law to prevent generic anaphylaxis products from reaching

1. A History of Doing What’s Right, MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS, http://www.mylan.com/en/
company (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
2. See Highlights of Prescribing Information Reference ID: 3932500, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Oct. 20, 2016) [hereinafter Highlights of Prescribing Information], http://www.accessdata.
fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2016/019430s061lbl.pdf; see also Cynthia Koons, Michael Keller &
Robert Langreth, How the EpiPen’s Price Rose and Fell, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 1, 2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-epipen-pricing/.
3. See, e.g., Koons, Keller & Langreth, supra note 2.
4. See Annual Financials for Mylan N.V., MARKETWATCH, http://www.marketwatch.com/
investing/stock/myl/financials (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
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the market, leaving consumers with an increasingly expensive option,5 albeit
a necessary one to save millions of American lives.6
In the past, the government has attempted to combat the lack of market
competition within the pharmaceutical industry, by passing laws attempting
to remove the potential for monopolization. In 1984, President Ronald
Reagan signed into law the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, better known as the Hatch-Waxman Amendments
(Hatch-Waxman or the Act).7 The intention of the Act was to make it easier
for generic drugs to enter the market.8 It attempted to do this by streamlining
and simplifying the application and approval process for generics, allowing
generic companies to circumvent the lengthy and expensive testing that
brand-name pharmaceuticals are subject to.9 In addition, the Act allows
generic manufacturers to challenge the patents of brand-name pharmaceutical
companies.10 Hatch-Waxman has done wonders for consumers and the
generic drug industry, generating more than $1.2 trillion in savings to the
health care system and creating a clear pathway to market for generic drugs.11
Although Hatch-Waxman has provided greater consumer access to lowcost, quality medication, the FDA still faces enormous challenges in ensuring
access to affordable and quality generic drugs.12 This is because HatchWaxman contains loopholes that allow brand-name pharmaceutical
companies, such as Mylan, to prevent generic drugs from reaching the market
and to do so legally. The meager safety net, if one would even call it that, is
the FDA’s power to approve generic drugs and to help maintain a fluid,
operating, and competitive market. However, the FDA has been immensely
backlogged with generic drug applications for new generic products.13 Aside
from the Generic Drug User Fee Amendments of 2012 (GDUFA), which
“requires [the] industry to pay user fees to supplement the cost of reviewing
generic drug applications,” and “enables the Agency to reduce current
backlog of pending applications,” there is little standing law helping the FDA
5. See, e.g., Reuters, Mylan’s EpiPen Price Hikes Reportedly Add Millions to Pentagon Costs,
FORTUNE (Oct. 26, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/28/mylan-epipen-price-hikes-pentagon/.
6. See Facts and Statistics, FARE FOOD ALLERGY RES. & EDUC., https://www.foodallergy.
org/facts-and-stats (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
7. See, e.g., Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D., Celebrating 30 Years of Easier Access to Cost Saving
Generic Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 24, 2014), http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.
php/tag/drug-price-competition-and-patent-term-restoration-act-of-1984/; see also ScherlingPlough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1059 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005).
8. See Hamburg, supra note 7.
9. See e.g., KENNETH GLAZER & JENÉE DESMOND-HARRIS, ANTITRUST HEALTHCARE
HANDBOOK, REVERSE PAYMENTS: HARD CASES EVEN UNDER GOOD LAW 15 (2010).
10. See, e.g., id.
11. See Hamburg, supra note 7 (noting that about eighty-five percent of all prescriptions filled
are generic versions).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Sydney Lupkin, EpiPen Controversy Fuels Concern Over Generic Drug Approval
Backlog, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 6, 2016), http://khn.org/news/epipen-controversy-fuelsconcerns-over-generic-drug-approval-backlog/.

2017]

Abuse of The Hatch-Waxman Act

591

get generics to market.14 Hatch-Waxman fails to prevent or penalize brandname companies from depriving consumers of an affordable generic product,
while the FDA is resigned to its slow, complex process of approving other
affordable drugs.
For example, Mylan, acting completely within the confines of HatchWaxman, has created a monopoly with its EpiPen and cleared the field of any
generic competition. This Note argues that the lack of regulation under
Hatch-Waxman enables pharmaceutical companies to drain the market of
generic competition, and thus requires drastic amendments. Part I of this Note
discusses the interrelation between Hatch-Waxman and the Sherman
Antitrust Act and explains how these statutes work together to regulate
pharmaceutical market activity, as well as Mylan’s current position in that
market. Part II introduces strategies pharmaceutical companies use to work
around Hatch-Waxman and facilitate monopolization of the pharmaceutical
industry. Part III considers the effect these practices have on consumers.
Lastly, Part IV discusses potential solutions to these problems, including the
creation of internal oversight committees on drug pricing and amendments to
Hatch-Waxman to ban reverse payments and bad faith citizen petitions.
I. REGULATING THE PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET
A. NEW DRUG APPLICATION (NDA): BRAND-NAME DRUG
APPLICATION PROCESS
Pharmaceutical companies, in the business of creating powerful and
potentially dangerous products, are subject to the rigorous FDA application
processes involved in getting a drug to the market.15 The FDA’s process
varies by whether a pharmaceutical company is seeking to introduce a brandname drug or a generic version of a brand-name drug.16 According to the
Hatch-Waxman, when a manufacturer seeks to bring a new brand-name drug
to the market it must submit a New Drug Application (NDA) containing
evidence that the drug is safe and effective.17 Whether the company has been
issued a patent for this drug or not, the FDA grants the brand-name
pharmaceutical company an “exclusivity” window, which prevents the

14. Generic Drug User Free Amendments of 2012, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.
fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/GenericDrugUserFees/default.htm (last updated Feb. 10, 2017).
15. See, e.g., How Drugs Are Developed and Approved, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/
(last updated Aug. 18, 2015).
16. See, e.g., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH SMALL BUS. & INDUS. ASSISTANCE
CHRONICLES, PATENTS AND EXCLUSIVITY 1 (2015), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssistance/UCM447307.pdf [hereinafter PATENTS
AND EXCLUSIVITY].
17. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)
(2012).
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submission or approval of similar generic drugs for a period of time. 18 This
provides the brand-name company an exclusive market right to sell the
product free of competition from any other drug, brand name or generic,
during the exclusivity period.19
The length of exclusivity granted to a new drug varies by the type of drug
and type of exclusivity granted. There are four types of exclusivity granted
to an NDA, which range from six months to seven years: Orphan Drug
Exclusivity (7 years), New Chemical Exclusivity (5 years), Pediatric
Exclusivity (6 months added to existing patents/exclusivity), and Other (3
years).20
B. ABBREVIATED NEW DRUG APPLICATION (ANDA):
STREAMLINING THE GENERIC APPLICATION PROCESS
Hatch-Waxman was designed to encourage new drug innovation and
“promote the availability of generic drugs, while still allowing for legitimate
patent claims and maintaining financial incentives for research and
development of new pharmaceuticals.”21 The Act attempts to encourage new
drug innovation by providing an alternate application process and exclusivity
period for generic drugs, called the Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA).22 A company looking to apply for generic drug approval files an
ANDA, which allows the generic company to supplement another company’s
NDA, an already approved brand-name application, with studies showing
that the generic company’s drug is the “bioequivalent to that of the brandname.”23 Though the generic must contain the same active ingredients as the
brand name, it may differ in terms of the drug’s inactive ingredients.24 This
streamlined process allows generic manufacturers to circumvent the lengthy
18. See, e.g., PATENTS AND EXCLUSIVITY, supra note 16, at 1.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2–3 (Orphan Drug Exclusivity is “granted to drugs designated and approved to treat

diseases or conditions affecting fewer than 200,000 [people] in the United States.” New Chemical
Exclusivity is “granted to drugs that contain no active moiety that has been approved by the FDA
under section 505(b).” Pediatric Exclusivity “grants an additional six months of market protection
at the end of listed patents and/or exclusivity for sponsor’s drug products containing active moiety,
when the sponsor has conducted and submitted pediatric studies on the active moiety in response to
a Written Request from the FDA.” “Other” Exclusivity is “granted to drugs when [the] application
or supplement contains reports of new clinical investigations conducted or sponsored by applicant
and essential for approval.”); see also 21 C.F.R §§ 316.31, 314.108 (2016); FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1997, S. 830-10, 105th Cong. § 505A (1997).
21. GLAZER & DESMOND-HARRIS, supra note 9, at 14.
22. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
23. Id. § 355(j)(8)(b)(i–ii) (both drugs deliver the same amount of the same active ingredient
content into a patient’s blood stream over the same amount of time). Generic manufacturers filing
ANDAs are required to submit the “Paragraph IV certification,” demonstrating that with respect to
each patent belonging to the brand-name drug that (1) no patent was listed to the drug, (2) the patent
has expired, (3) the ANDA drug will not be marked until the patent expires, and (4) the patent is
invalid or would not be infringed by the generic version. See id. § 355 (b)(2)(A).
24. See id. § 355(j)(2).
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and comprehensive application process that a brand-name drug must
undergo.
The first company, or “first flier,” to submit an ANDA has the exclusive
right to market the generic drug for 180 days.25 However, “a branded drug
manufacturer is permitted to market an authorized generic version of its own
brand product at any time, including during the 180 days after the first generic
competitor enters the market.”26 So, although the exclusivity period is very
valuable and gives “generic manufactures strong incentives to challenge the
patented products of the branded drug manufacturer,”27 there is yet another
challenge facing generic drugs, in that they are not awarded true exclusivity.
Instead, they must compete with the brand-name company’s generic drugs,
since the approved brand-name company is not excluded from entering the
market during the 180-day period.28
The brand-name drug company is thus incentivized to produce a generic
version of its own drug and apply for generic drug approval, since they will
not be banned from the exclusivity period and will reap the profits of both
drugs. According to the FDA, when generic products enter the market they
do so with a slow decrease in product price.29 This gradual decrease in
product price is initiated by the first generic competitor, which markets its
product cheaper, but very close to that of the brand-name product. The second
generic manufacturer then continues to reduce the price to nearly half the
brand-name drug.30 Products that are in high demand can attract a larger
number of generic manufacturers and drop the price to twenty percent below
the brand-name price.31
As a result of generics’ somewhat “fast-track” to market by way of the
Hatch-Waxman, brand-name companies are interested in delaying or
preventing competing generics from hitting the market with a lower-priced

25. See, e.g., PATENTS AND EXCLUSIVITY, supra note 16, at 3.
26. FTC Sues Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Others for Illegally Blocking Lower-Cost Generic

Versions of the Branded Drugs Opana ER and Lidoderm, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 31, 2016)
[hereinafter FTC Sues Endo Pharmaceuticals], https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2016/03/ftc-sues-endo-pharmaceuticals-inc-others-illegally-blocking-lower.
27. GLAZER & DESMOND-HARRIS, supra note 9 at 15.
28. See FTC Sues Endo Pharmaceuticals, supra note 26.
29. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS
HAS AFFECTED THE PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY xii (1998)
[hereinafter INCREASED COMPETITION].
30. See, e.g., Generic Competition and Drug Prices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/centersoffices/officeofmedicalproductsandtobacco/CDER/ucm12938
5.htm (last updated May 13, 2015); see also INCREASED COMPETITION, supra note 29 (stating that
the CBO suggests a slightly different impact on prices, reporting that when a brand name loses its
patent, the first generic competitor to enter the market typically enters at a price point 25% lower
than the brand-name and additional generics on the market lower the price by as much as 60% of
the brand-name price).
31. See, e.g., Generic Competition and Drug Prices, supra note 30; see also INCREASED
COMPETITION, supra note 29.
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product and causing the brand-name companies to lose a percentage of their
market share.
C. SHERMAN ACT & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT
Once approved to sell a drug on the market, pharmaceutical companies
must abide by two core federal antitrust laws, which “have had the same basic
objective: to protect the process of competition for the benefit of consumers,
making sure there are strong incentives for businesses to operate efficiently,
keep prices down, and keep quality up.”32 The Sherman Antitrust Act,
enacted in 1890, outlaws “every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade,” and monopolization, attempted
monopolization, or conspiracy or combination to monopolize.33 The Sherman
Act does not, however, actually prohibit every restraint of trade, at least
according to the courts that have interpreted it, but rather only those restraints
that are unreasonable.34 Violators of the Sherman Act are potentially subject
to both civil actions and Department of Justice criminal prosecution.35
The second law, the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), bans
“unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices,”
and allows the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to bring actions for similar
kinds of activities that violate the Sherman Act.36 In addition to these federal
statutes, most states have additional antitrust laws.37 Pharmaceutical
companies such as Mylan, however, have managed to shield themselves from
these federal statutes by slipping through the gaps that the Hatch-Waxman
has left open.
D. MYLAN’S MARKET
Mylan’s EpiPen devices are intended for immediate administration and
are used in the “emergency treatment of allergic reactions.”38 These devices
are used to combat anaphylactic reactions to stinging insects, biting insects,
foods, drugs, diagnostic testing substances, and other allergens, as well as
idiopathic anaphylaxis and exercise-induced anaphylaxis.39 Studies show that

32. Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
33. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012).
34. See, e.g., Antitrust Laws, supra note 32.
35. Id. (“The Sherman Act imposes criminal penalties up to $100 million for a corporation and
$1 million for an individual, along with up to 10 years in prison. Under federal law, the maximum
fine may be increased to twice the amount the conspirators gained from the illegal acts or twice the
money lost by the victims of the crime, if either of those amounts is over $100 million.”).
36. Id. (“The Supreme Court has said that all violations of the Sherman Act also violate the FTC
Act.”); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45 (a)(1), (a)(4)(B).
37. Id.
38. Highlights of Prescribing Information, supra note 2.
39. See id. (Anaphylaxis is a severe and potentially deadly allergic reaction.).
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anaphylaxis—a severe, life-threatening reaction—is very common and
occurs in at least one in fifty adults, more likely closer to one in twenty.40
It is not preposterous to assume that with the prevalence of this dangerous
allergic reaction that medical studies, experts, and pharmaceutical companies
would be working to supply consumers with reasonable, effective, and lifesaving devices to combat this condition. Oddly enough, there are only two
treatments: Mylan’s EpiPen and Amedra Pharmaceuticals’ Adrenaclick.41
The FDA approved both Mylan’s EpiPen and EpiPen Jr. on December 22,
1987, and both products have patent expiration dates of September 11,
2025.42 It is estimated that in 2015, 3.6 million Americans received an EpiPen
prescription.43 The FDA approved Amedra Pharmaceuticals’ Adrenaclick on
November 25, 2009.44
The next questions, naturally, are: why are there only two such lifesaving medical devices, and how has Mylan been able to raise the price of
the EpiPen 548% since it began selling the product in 2007?45 Consumers
without insurance or with a high-deductible plan end up paying the full list
price for a two-pack, the only way either EpiPen is currently sold.46 As a
result, “EpiPen is Mylan’s top-selling product, generating more than $1
billion of the company’s $9.5 billion [in] total revenue last year.”47 Mylan
receives hardly any competition from Adrenaclick and essentially dominates
the market; “[i]n fact, Mylan has about an [eighty-nine percent] market share
currently.”48

40. See, e.g., Dr. Robert Wood et al., Anaphylaxis in America: The Prevalence and
Characteristics of Anaphylaxis in the United States, 133 J. ALLERGY & CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY
461, 462 (2014); see also Press Release, Asthma & Allergy Found. of Am., New Study Shows
Nearly 1-In-50 At-Risk For Severe Allergic Reactions (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.aafa.org/
media/Anaphylaxis-in-America-Press-Release-2014.pdf.
41. See Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/search_product.cfm
(last visited Mar. 24, 2017); see also Ciara Linnane, CVS Takes on Mylan’s EpiPen with Much
Cheaper Version of an Alternative, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 15, 2017, 12:01 PM), http://www.market
watch.com/story/cvs-takes-on-mylans-epipen-with-much-cheaper-version-of-an-alternative-201701-12.
42. See Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,
Epipen, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. [hereinafter Epipen Evaluation], http://www.accessdata.fda.
gov/scripts/cder/ob/results_product.cfm?Appl_Type=N&Appl_No=019430 (last visited Feb. 20,
2017).
43. See Jonathan D. Rockoff, Mylan Faces Scrutiny Over EpiPen Price Increases, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 24, 2016, 5:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/mylan-faces-scrutiny-over-epipen-priceincreases-1472074823.
44. See Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,
Adrenaclick, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/results_
product.cfm?Appl_Type=N&Appl_No=020800 (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
45. See, e.g., Rockoff, supra note 43.
46. See, e.g., Koons, Keller & Langreth, supra note 2.
47. Rockoff, supra note 43.
48. Ed Silverman, How Mylan Tried to Keep Teva from Selling a Generic EpiPen, STAT (Aug.
31, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/08/31/mylan-teva-generic-epipen/.
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Mylan’s continued success and financial gain from its EpiPen sales are
due, in part, to the lack of generic competition. Mylan has been able to
monopolize this area of the pharmaceutical drug industry using tactics to
delay generic market entry or by convincing generic manufacturers to
abandon their market entry altogether.49
II. STRATEGIC DERAILMENT OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
Mylan and other pharmaceutical companies have the ability to derail
Hatch-Waxman because there is no federal regulation capping drug pricing
in the United States, and the Act, the one statute designed to increase the flow
of generic market entry, fails to fill that void. The Act has led to many
unforeseen situations as the industry has developed. The looming expiration
of a patent, together with the approaching 180-day generic exclusivity period,
has incentivized brand-name companies to creatively and legally come up
with a host of ways to cement their market shares, while making and saving
as much money as possible.
A. REVERSE PAYMENTS
As a result of the 180-day exclusivity period, “more generic filers are
seeking to enter the market sooner.”50 Although the intent behind the
exclusivity period is to encourage this generic competition, the 180-day
exclusivity period has “ultimately created an incentive for the brand and
generic companies to limit competition with each other.”51 Since generic
manufacturers typically gain an average of 44% of sales of branded drugs
within the first year they are allowed to go to market, brand-name companies
want to keep these threatening generics out of the hands of the public for at
least those 180 days.52 As a result, instead of generics competing for the first
flier position, they are now competing to be the first company paid off by the
brand-name companies not to enter the market.53
49. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Division of Dockets Management, Mylan-Citizen Petition,
Jan. 16, 2015 [hereinafter Mylan-Citizen Petition]; see also Press Release, Mylan, Inc., Mylan and
Pfizer Announce Epinephrine Auto-injector Settlement Agreement With Teva, (Oct. 6, 2012, 4:00
PM) [hereinafter Epinephrine Auto-Injector Settlement], http://newsroom.mylan.com/pressreleases?item=123144; see also Wyden, Pallone Confirm EpiPen Makers Overcharged Medicaid
for Two Decades, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON FIN. (Sept. 28, 2016) [hereinafter EpiPen Makers
Overcharged Medicaid], http://www.finance.senate.gov/ranking-members-news/wyden-palloneconfirm-epipen-makers-overcharged-medicaid-for-two-decades.
50. Alyssa L. Brown, Modest Proposals for a Complex Problem: Patent Misuse and
Incremental Changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act as Solutions to the Problem of Reverse Payment
Settlements, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 583, 588 (2012).
51. GLAZER & DESMOND-HARRIS, supra note 9, at 15.
52. See, e.g., GLAZER & DESMOND-HARRIS, supra note 9, at 15.
53. See, e.g., JON LEIBOWITZ, CHAIRMAN, FED. TRADE COMM’N, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS,
PAY FOR DELAY SETTLEMENTS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: HOW CONGRESS CAN STOP
ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT, PROTECT CONSUMERS’ WALLETS, AND HELP PAY FOR HEALTH
CARE REFORM (THE $35 BILLION SOLUTION) 1, 5 (June 23, 2009).
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One major, controversial strategy pharmaceutical companies use to halt
generic entry is known as “reverse payment,” or “pay-for-delay.”54 Reverse
payments are essentially arrangements in which the brand manufacturer sues
the generic manufacturer for patent infringement, arising from invalidity of
the required Paragraph IV certification of the ANDA,55 whether or not there
actually is patent infringement.56 These cases quickly settle with the brandname manufacturer paying the generic manufacturer in exchange for the
generic’s delay in launching its product.57 These settlements make sense for
both companies since, from the outset, the generic stands to make less profit
than the brand name stands to lose from its entry.58 As former FTC Chairman
Jon Leibowitz explained in 2009:
So if it is legal for a brand to pay the generic to ‘sit it out,’ why wouldn’t it?
And if the generic drug company is allowed to make more money by not
competing than by going to market, isn’t that a good business deal for the
company and its shareholders? Of course it is. 59

The payment from the brand name to the generic company typically
accounts for the amount of money that consumers would have saved if the
generic drug actually went to the market.60 Instead, both companies share the
“pool of money” that the Act actually intended to save consumers.61 In fact,
reverse payment settlements actually “cost American consumers anywhere
between $0.6 billion and $7.5 billion each year, or $3.5 billion each year on
average.”62
It is likely that Mylan dipped its feet in the reverse payment pool in 2012
when they filed a patent infringement suit against Israeli pharmaceutical
company Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., which sought permission
from the FDA to manufacture, market, and sell a generic version of the
EpiPen.63 Mylan quietly announced an agreement wherein Teva would not
launch a generic epinephrine auto-injector until 2015, subject to FDA

54. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY FOR DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 1 (2010) [hereinafter DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS].
55. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(8)(b)(i–ii) (2012).
56. See, e.g., DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS, supra note 54, at 8–9.
57. See, e.g., GLAZER & DESMOND-HARRIS, supra note 9, at 15.
58. See GLAZER & DESMOND-HARRIS, supra note 9 (noting that generic competitor drugs
normally enter the market at prices between twenty and thirty percent lower than prices of brandname counterparts. Some enter the market as much as eighty percent or more below that of a brandname drug).
59. LEIBOWITZ, supra note 53, at 4.
60. See id.
61. GLAZER & DESMOND-HARRIS, supra note 9, at 15.
62. Brown, supra note 50, at 590 (“As such, the FTC asserts that banning these agreements
outright has the potential to save consumers $35 billion over the course of a decade.”); see also
DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS, supra note 54, at 8–10.
63. See Epinephrine Auto-Injector Settlement, supra note 49.
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approval of its ANDA.64 After waiting three years per the terms of the
settlement, Teva’s launch was again delayed due to a lengthy citizen petition
Mylan threw its way in 2015. Eventually, the FDA rejected Teva’s ANDA in
the spring of 2016.65 Mylan quickly took advantage of this continued
exclusivity period and raised the price of its EpiPen two-pack to $609.66
Although it has not been officially reported that Teva and Mylan engaged
in a reverse payment settlement, the holes in the Hatch-Waxman allow Mylan
to lawfully pay off a generic manufacturer such as Teva and implement major
price increases. It is difficult to imagine Teva agreeing to refrain from market
entry and giving up its spot as the only company with a generic epinephrine
injector on the market without hefty consideration from the billion-dollar
brand-name company. Other drug companies have also circumvented the
statute by entering into these reverse payment settlements.67 The Act,
however, does not account for these reverse payments that thwart the
consumer benefits of generic competition. Such failure has resulted in
judicial uncertainty and Circuit splits concerning reverse payments.
In FTC v. Actavis, the Supreme Court ruled that brand-name and generic
pharmaceutical companies are subject to antitrust scrutiny for engaging in
reverse payment settlements, since these payments deter generic entry and
contribute to rising health care costs that consumers and governments are
struggling to keep up with.68 The Supreme Court rejected a common defense
used by pharmaceutical companies that claim to be acting within the “scope
of the patent,” in paying off generics to delay market entry.69 The Court
applied the “rule of reason” antitrust analysis and outlined some
considerations to justify its decision to subject reverse payment settlements
to antitrust scrutiny.70 Though a somewhat successful ruling for the FTC,
Actavis failed to fill the gaping holes in Hatch-Waxman that allow for this
type of activity.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Anna Edney & Cynthia Koons, Plastic Cap is the Crux of Mylan Argument Against

Teva’s EpiPen, BLOOMBERG MKTS. (Aug. 31, 2016, 4:04 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-08-31/plastic-cap-is-crux-of-mylan-argument-against-competing-epipen;
see
generally Mylan-Citizen Petition, supra note 49.
66. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Mylan Raised EpiPen’s Price Before the Expected Arrival of a
Generic, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2016, at B1.
67. See, e.g., LEIBOWITZ, supra note 53, at 4.
68. See Remarks of Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC v. Actavis and the
Future of Reverse Payment Cases 1, 3 (Sept. 26, 2013) [hereinafter Wright Remarks]; see also FTC
v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013).
69. See, e.g., Wright Remarks, supra note 68, at 1, 3.
70. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38; see also Kenneth R. O’Rouke, Jon Sallet & Katrina
Robinson, FTC v. Actavis: Reconciling Conflicts in Rule of Reasons, LAW360 (July 2, 2013, 5:55
PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/453428/ftc-v-actavis-reconciling-conflicts-in-rule-of-reason
(“The problem with the rule of reason is that it can be expensive and burdensome . . . . In rejecting
the FTC’s quick-look analysis, the court has hastened to add that a full-scale rule of reason analysis
is not always necessary. Rather . . . the Actavis court endorsed a ‘sliding scale in appraising
reasonableness.’”).
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The latest pay-for-delay suit accused Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. of
paying Watson Pharmaceuticals Inc. to delay its launch of a generic version
of the lidocaine pain patch.71 In January 2017, Endo and the FTC settled the
claim that Endo violated Section 5 of the FTCA by entering into a reversepayment settlement agreement with Watson, resolving all litigation between
Endo and the FTC.72 Though Endo “denies that it engaged in any illegal
conduct under the deal,” the settlement “prohibits the company from entering
into the same type of reverse payment patent infringement settlement for
[ten] years, including agreements that involve promises by branded drug
makers not to market competing authorized generics.”73 Although the FTC’s
commitment to stopping reverse payments continues, the fact remains that
reverse payments are an attractive and, if done strategically in light of these
rulings, legal practice that works to favor corporations to the detriment of
consumers.
In an attempt to combat the derailment of Hatch-Waxman via reverse
settlements, Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement
and Modernization Act of 2003, which required such settlements to be filed
with the FTC within ten days of being agreed upon.74 Congress sought to stop
companies from quickly settling through a reverse payment without the FTC
hovering over quiet payouts.75 One brand-name company, following an
industry pattern of circumventing the law, attempted to get around this
requirement by lying to the FTC about the true nature of the settlement.76
In regard to the settlement between Mylan and Teva,77 consumers are left
to foot the bill without any explanation of why this generic is not on the
market. This is because there is no disclosure requirement for these patent
infringement settlements. Hatch-Waxman has the foundational purpose and
potential to combat this abuse of the market. These reverse payments can be
outlawed and phased out as a legal tool for cementing a brand-name
company’s position in the market.

71. See, e.g., FTC Sues Endo Pharmaceuticals, supra note 26.
72. See, e.g., Kelly Knaub, Endo Settles Pay-For-Delay Suit As FTC Renews Watson Case, LAW

360 (Jan. 23, 2017, 11:07 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/883817?scroll=1.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., GLAZER & DESMOND-HARRIS, supra note 9, at 16.
75. Id.
76. See LEIBOWITZ, supra note 53, at 2 (“Bristol-Meyers was the subject of an FTC order
stemming from charges that, among other things, it paid a competitor to drop a patent challenge. So
when it decided to settle a patent case with a company planning to sell a generic version of Plavix .
. . Bristol-Meyers had a problem . . . . In an attempt to evade FTC review, Bristol-Meyers lied about
a secret deal, in which it agreed to provide substantial payments to a generic competitor to stay out
of the market. Both Dr. Bodner and his former employer subsequently pleaded guilty to criminal
charges of making false statements.”).
77. See Epinephrine Auto-Injector, supra note 49.

600

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 11

B. CITIZENS’ PETITIONS
The citizen petition is another tactic that brand name companies use to
impede competitors’ efforts to enter the market. According to the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the FDA must provide the public with
a right to petition an agency rule.78 A citizen petition is a means through
which the FDA allows the public to invoke their right to petition for the
issuance, amendment, or revocation of a rule, or to petition the FTC “to take
or refrain from taking any other form of administrative action.”79 The citizen
petition must contain, amongst other things, the factual and legal grounds for
the petition.80 In theory, the right to petition a government agency allows for
an “important route of dialogue” that provides the public “with an invaluable
tool for getting good scientific arguments in front of the FDA.”81 In addition,
the citizen petition is intended to raise valid medical and safety issues that
the FDA considers, addresses, and reports on to the filing pharmaceutical
company. In practice, however, brand-name companies have been able to
morph this right of the people into a clever business tactic to delay FDA
approval of competing generic drugs, without facing any legal or regulatory
penalty for doing so.
Brand-name pharmaceutical companies can ask the FDA to take a
particular action against a pending ANDA through the use of a 505(q) citizen
petition, the petition that brand names “are most likely to file to delay generic
entry.”82 The FDA is mandated to take final action on these petitions no later
than 150 days after the petition’s filing date, unless a delay would be
necessary to protect the public health.83 Though the FDA must respond to the
citizen petition within 150 days, it does not have to do so before it rules on
the ANDA.84 Current FDA policy is to assess the citizen petition prior to
approving the ANDA, but the FDA often waits to release the response to the
citizen petition alongside releasing the ruling on the accompanying ANDA. 85
Since the FDA often responds to the citizen petition and ANDA
simultaneously, it is not difficult to imagine a situation wherein an ANDA is
weeks from being approved or the brand-name drug’s patent is nearing
expiration, and the brand name files a 505(q) petition at this time. This tactic
effectively pushes back the approval of the ANDA by taking advantage of
78.
79.
80.
81.

See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012).
21 C.F.R. §§ 10.25, 10.30 (2017).
See id. § 10.30(b)(3).
Scott Gottlieb, Deputy Comm’r, Med. & Sci. Affairs, Remarks Before Annual Generic Drug
Forum (Apr. 7, 2006), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm051966.htm.
82. Michael A. Carrier & Carl Minniti, Citizen Petitions: Long, Late-Filed, and At-Last Denied,
66 AM. U. L. REV. 305, 327 (2016).
83. See Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA), Pub. L. No. 112144, 126 Stat. 993, 1123 (2012) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012)).
84. See, e.g., Darren S. Tucker, FDA Citizen Petitions: A New Means of Delaying Generic Entry,
20 ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRONICLE 10 (2016).
85. Id.
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the FDA’s well- reasoned policy of thoroughly vetting the citizen petition
before approving the ANDA. These petitions are known as “eleventh hour”
petitions because companies would file them “on the eve of drug approval
for the purpose of delay.”86
Brand-name manufacturers continue to file long and complex eleventh
hour 505(q) petitions that push back the generic approval clock up to 150
days. Despite the 505(q) petition requirement that petitioners to certify that
they did not delay in filing the petition, these eleventh hour petitions are
extremely common in the pharmaceutical industry.87 “Evidence that citizen
petitions are used to delay generic entry can be inferred from the vast number
of petitions that the FDA denies.”88 Specifically, the FDA denied 94% of
citizen petitions challenging the approval of ANDAs in 2013, 95% in 2014,
and 100% in 2015.89 This tactic serves to delay the approval process of a
generic drug, which the amended application process Hatch-Waxman
purposely accelerated.
1. Mylan’s Citizen Petition
In a 2006 press release, future Mylan CEO Heather Bresch called for an
end to the abuse of citizen petitions being used by brand-name companies to
delay access to affordable drugs:
The brand industry is misusing the citizen petition process to improperly
delay generic competition. . . .[W]hen the process is abused, a citizen
petition can become a tool for the brand industry to delay timely entry for
safe and effective generic drugs. 90

Around the time this press release was written, Mylan was experiencing
their own delay in generic approval because the brand-name company Ortho
McNeil Pharmaceuticals filed a citizen petition against Mylan.91 Bresch
expressed her distrust of frivolous citizen petitions that “give brand
companies an undeserved patent extension, at no cost and with no
86. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier & Daryl Wander, Citizen Petitions: An Empirical Study, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 249, 264 (2012).
87. See Carrier & Minniti, supra note 82 at 328; 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(H) (2012).
88. Carrier & Minniti, supra note 82, at 330.
89. Id. at 333 (In 2013, only two of thirty-three petitions were granted; in 2014, only one of
twenty-one petitions were granted; and in 2015, all thirteen petitions were denied.).
90. Mylan Calls for an End to Abusive Practice That Delay Access to Affordable
Pharmaceuticals, MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS, http://newsroom.mylan.com/press-releases?item=
122607 (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
91. See id. (“Mylan’s generic version of the drug had already been tentatively approved by the
FDA, meaning the lawsuit was the only thing standing in the way of our ability to launch our
product. On the eve of a decision from the district court invalidating the patent, Ortho McNeil
Pharmaceuticals filed a citizen petition requesting that the FDA re-think its standards for approving
generic versions on the drug. The petition raised no new information . . . and certainly appears to
have been timed to delay final approval of our generic drug. Ten months later, the patent stands
invalid but we are still unable to obtain final approval from the FDA.”).
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consequences.”92 Nine years later, on January 15, 2015, Mylan filed one of
these “frivolous citizen petitions,” in an attempt to grant itself an “undeserved
patent extension,” previously denounced by the company’s now CEO.93
As previously discussed,94 Israeli pharmaceutical company Teva settled
a lawsuit with Mylan in 2012, in which “Teva agreed to delay the launch of
its generic epinephrine auto-injector for more than three years, until June
2015.”95 After waiting three years, however, Mylan submitted a 505(q)
citizen petition just six months before Teva was allowed to launch, asking
the FDA to reject Teva’s product.96 Four months after the submission of this
petition, and one month before the expiration of the FDA’s 150-day deadline
to respond, Mylan submitted a forty-eight-page supplement to its petition,
ultimately requiring the FDA to take more time to thoroughly consider
whether any valid safety and health concerns existed in the 505(q) citizen
petition.97
The petition included a study, paid for by Mylan, which claimed that
Teva’s product would have a 93% failure rate.98 The study, however, had no
control group and the participants did not actually manipulate the device or
perform the injection.99 Mylan, in conducting a study without a control group
and without manipulating the device itself, failed to show any effort to
produce a valid, scientific study concerned with addressing the safety of
Teva’s medical device.100 In addition, Teva had been in the process of
developing its product for six years.101 Mylan’s failure to disclose alleged
medical hazards in a reasonably timely manner prior to the release date of
Teva’s product is the exact behavior Hatch-Waxman sought to prevent. This
eleventh hour seventy-six-page submission was ultimately dismissed by the
FDA for failure to include valid scientific results.102 The submission,
however, mirrors a common pattern found by Rutgers Law Professor Michael
Carrier, in that more than two thirds of citizen petitions come from brand92.
93.
94.
95.

49.

Id.
See generally Mylan-Citizen Petition, supra note 49.
See supra Part IIA.
Carrier & Minniti, supra note 82, at 350; Epinephrine Auto-injector Settlement, supra note

96. See Mylan-Citizen Petition, supra note 49.
97. See Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III, The Untold EpiPen Story: How Mylan Hiked

Prices by Blocking Rivals, 102 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 53, 64 (2017) (citing Supplement from
Mylan Specialty, L.P., Docket No. FDA-2015-P-0181-0007 at *10 (posted May 28, 2015)).
98. See Chris Glorioso & Evan Stulberger, I-Team: Company Behind EpiPen Fought to Keep
Cheaper Generic Off the Market, NBC4 N.Y. (Aug. 31, 2016, 7:17 AM), http://www.nbcnewyork
.com/news/local/EpiPen-Cheap-Generic-Teva-Product-Mylan-Investigation-Drug-Cost391758871.html; see also Mylan-Citizen Petition, supra note 49.
99. See, e.g., Glorioso & Stulberger, supra note 98.
100. See Carrier & Minniti, supra note 82, at 351.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Carly Helfand, FDA Swats Down Teva’s EpiPen Copy, Putting Mylan in Cruise
Control, FIERCE PHARMA (Mar. 1, 2016, 10:39 AM), http://www.fiercepharma.com/sales-andmarketing/fda-swats-down-teva-s-epipen-copy-putting-mylan-cruise-control.
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name companies seeking to block cheaper generics from hitting the
market.103 Carrier explained: “Every day that [brand-name companies] can
delay generic entry could be millions of dollars lining its pockets . . . . Brand
name companies often strategically time the filing of their citizen petitions to
coordinate with patent infringement lawsuits—which also work to slow
down generics seeking FDA approval.”104
In theory, the longer the petition the more legitimate scientific issues it
addresses; however, the petitions that are longer than average actually show
a reduced likelihood of success.105 In 2015, the average length of citizen
petitions filed was thirty-two pages.106 Mylan’s seventy-six-page total length
does little to hide its classification as an eleventh hour petition. Instead, it
makes clear that these “long petitions seem geared not to raising legitimate
safety concerns but to bogging down the FDA and delaying generic entry.”107
Though the FDA rejected Teva’s ANDA in the spring of 2016, such
rejection was not a consequence of Mylan’s 505(q) petition.108 The only
consequence of Mylan’s petition was a further delay in the FDA’s ruling on
the product. As Mylan’s own CEO previously stated, “[t]hese extensions
provide anywhere from a few months to over a year of additional
monopoly.”109 Mylan’s involvement with competing generic drug company
Teva is a prime example of how Mylan, through its probable use of reverse
payments and use of the citizen petition, is able to legally and intentionally
delay generic entry to the market.
There are reasonable, sound purposes for use of the citizen petition. It is
not the general citizen petition that needs change, but the calculated nature of
eleventh hour petitions to delay generic entry that needs attention.
C. DRUG MISCLASSIFICATION
Mylan is currently one of two brand-name companies with an available
anaphylaxis product on the market,110 and is therefore enjoying the
exclusivity for the time being.111 However, Mylan has recently come under
much public scrutiny for wrongly classifying its brand name EpiPen as a
103. See Glorioso & Stulberger, supra note 98.
104. Id.
105. See Carrier & Minniti, supra note 82, at 336–37 (“In 2013, when the average page length

was 21, the two granted petitions were 13 and 15 pages long. And in 2014, when the average page
length was 26, the only granted petition was 15 pages long.”).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Helfand, supra note 102 (In this rejection, regulators from the FDA flagged
deficiencies with Teva’s product.).
109. Mylan Calls for an End to Abusive Practice That Delay Access to Affordable
Pharmaceuticals, MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS, http://newsroom.mylan.com/press-releases?item=1
22607 (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
110. See, e.g., Adrenaclick, AMEDRA PHARMACEUTICALS LLC, http://adrenaclick.com/ (last
visited Feb. 20, 2017).
111. See Epipen Evaluation, supra note 42.
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generic drug to the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program (the Medicaid
Program).112 The Medicaid Program, which helps to “offset the Federal and
State costs of most outpatient prescription drugs dispensed to Medicaid
patients,” requires drug companies to enter into a rebate agreement with the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services.113 If a drug
manufacturer hopes to be covered under Medicaid, this agreement requires
that the drug manufacturer submit product and pricing data to the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and requires the manufacturer to
pay a quarterly rebate to states for the drug payments they make under state
plans.114 These payments are then shared between states and the federal
government “to offset the overall cost of prescription drugs under the
Medicaid Program.”115 The amount of rebate the manufacturer is required to
pay is based on statutory formulas and determined by the data the
manufacturer provides.116
According to the Administrator of CMS, “innovator drugs,” or brandname products, pay a rebate of 23% under the Medicaid Program, and “noninnovator drugs,” or generic products, pay a 13% rebate.117 Despite having
reaped the exclusive financial benefits of its brand-name EpiPen
monopolizing the market, Mylan misclassified the drug to the Medicaid Drug
Rebate Program as “generic” from 1997 to 2016, and has saved millions of
dollars each year by paying half the quarterly required rebate amount.118
Though this activity has not directly prevented generics from reaching
the market, it works to conceal information from government entities and the
general public that the market lacks a generic epinephrine injector. The
Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, under the impression that there was a
generic version available to consumers, failed to expose Mylan for its
purposeful monopolization of the market for almost twenty years. In addition,
the misclassification of the drug actually cost consumers and state
governments millions of dollars.119 Since “states and the federal government

112. See generally Epipen Makers Overcharged Medicaid, supra note 49.
113. Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/

prescription-drugs/medicaid-drug-rebate-program/index.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2017).
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. Epipen Makers Overcharged Medicaid, supra note 49.
118. See id.; see also Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.
gov/medicaid/prescription-drugs/medicaid-drug-rebate-program/index.html (last visited Mar. 11,
2017).
119. See Ed Silverman, Fed Slams Mylan for Misclassifying EpiPen, with “Financial
Consequences’ to Medicaid, STAT (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/
09/29/cms-slams-mylan-epipen-medicaid/ (“Minnesota officials believe the misclassification may
have cost the state about $4 million. ‘If this is true and indicative of the relative costs at other states,
we believe the misclassification could be sizable for Mylan, as Minnesota represents less than 2
percent of the US population,’ Wells Fargo analyst David Maris wrote in an investor note
Thursday.”).
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use the rebates from drug makers to offset the cost of covering medicines,”
Mylan’s misclassification became the taxpayers’ issue.120
Not only has this misclassification kept government entities in the dark
about the true nature of the epinephrine market, but it has also kept other
manufacturers in the dark as well. Potential competitors are dis-incentivized
from producing a generic product when research indicates that Mylan’s
EpiPen allegedly already has both the brand name and generic market
covered. This “no room for other” mentality propagated by Mylan, and
perhaps other brand-name drug manufacturers as well, indirectly furthers
Mylan’s monopoly power.
D. PRODUCT HOPPING
Another hole in Hatch-Waxman has allowed companies to engage in
“forced-switch schemes,” or “product hopping.”121 The forced-switch
scheme is a strategy used by pharmaceutical companies in which a brandname company has an NDA drug on the market, but whose patent exclusivity
period is almost expired, allowing for a generic version to soon enter and
compete.122 Instead of using a reverse-payment strategy or filing citizen
petitions against the generic company, brand-name companies have
completely withdrawn their own drugs from the market and quickly
introduced their own generic versions as a substitute.123 Although another
generic may come to the market after the forced-switch scheme, the court in
Actavis, for example, found it unlikely that a patient with Alzheimer’s disease
would choose to switch to the competitor’s generic after being forced to
already switch to the brand-name company’s generic version.124 This pattern
of behavior may be mimicked when it concerns a drug that is in high demand,
such as the EpiPen. This scheme essentially coerces patients to switch from
the company’s brand-name product to the same company’s generic product,
all the while maintaining their effective monopoly in the drug market.125
This strategy grew in popularity until the Second Circuit became the first
appellate court to finally address “product hopping” in Actavis.126 The
Second Circuit held that a scheme to coerce patients to switch from an old
product to a new one, by withdrawing from the market with an intent to affect
generic competition, violated antitrust laws.127 The court indicated, though,

120. Id.
121. New York v. Actavis, 787 F.3d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 2015).
122. See, e.g., Jonathan Lapook, Forced Switch? Drug Cos. Develop Maneuvers to Hinder

Generic Competition, CBS NEWS (Aug. 28, 2014, 8:40 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/drugcompanies-develop-maneuvers-to-hinder-generic-competition/.
123. See Actavis, 787 F.3d at 642.
124. Id. at 642–43.
125. Id. at 654.
126. Id. at 643.
127. See id. at 652–654.
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that efforts to persuade patients to make the switch, while keeping the old
product available, would be permissible.128
As a result of public scrutiny of Mylan for the rising price of the EpiPen,
the company announced it would release its own generic version of the
EpiPen for half the price.129 If Mylan were to do so, the removal of the brandname EpiPen from the market immediately followed by the introduction of
the generic version would be prohibited, as per the Second Circuit
decision.130 This forced “hard switch” would be the exact mechanism used to
maintain the relevant market monopoly that the Actavis court wished to
prevent.131 By contrast, the introduction of its own generic while keeping the
brand name EpiPen on the market, also known as the “soft switch” is
permissible.132
Although the Second Circuit’s reliance on antitrust laws worked to
outlaw this strategy, it was a result of gaping holes in the Hatch-Waxman Act
that allowed Actavis to create a monopoly of its relevant market in the first
place.133 The Act has been ineffective at proactively combating these
strategies because the Act does not itself forbid these tactics. Mylan and other
companies are not technically violating the Act, but reap the benefits for years
until the strategies are challenged in court.134 Thus, without strict
amendments to the Act that would work to further protect both generic
applicants and approved generics, Mylan and other brand-name companies
will continue to game the patent system to protect their monopolies. In
addition, since these practices are prohibited by judicial precedent135 and not
by a legislative enactment, there is no telling if or when a court may decide
to overturn such a ruling.
III. EFFECT ON CONSUMERS
A. INSURED CONSUMERS
Consumers’ interaction and involvement with Hatch-Waxman is limited,
in that consumers are only aware of the enormous out-of-pocket price they
are forced to pay every year for the two-pack of EpiPens. There is one area
of the market with abundant price competition wherein consumers actually
128. See id. at 654.
129. See Mylan to Launch First Generic to EpiPen Auto Injector at a List Price of $300 per Two-

Pack Carton, a More than 50% Discount to the Bran Product, MYLAN INC. (Aug. 29, 2016)
[hereinafter First Generic], http://newsroom.mylan.com/2016-08-29-Mylan-to-Launch-FirstGeneric-to-EpiPen-Auto-Injector-at-a-List-Price-of-300-per-Two-Pack-Carton-a-More-than-50Discount-to-the-Brand-Product.
130. See Actavis, 787 F.3d at 651.
131. Id. at 661.
132. Id. at 654.
133. Id. at 649.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 659.
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reap the benefits of consistent EpiPen prices.136 This area consists of giant
companies, known as pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), which manage the
drugs patients need and pit drug companies against each other to lower
prices.137 PBMs also offer these drugs at discounted prices.138 For example,
PBMs have fought for discounts and rebates on the EpiPen by playing
competitors off each other, excluding certain companies like Auvi-Q from its
list of preferred drugs, and holding the cost steady for certain insured
consumers.139 In fact, the co-payments for commercially insured consumers
rose only forty-five cents from 2015 to 2016, even though the price of the
EpiPen 2-pak rose by 51%.140
The problem today, however, is that not all consumers have the luxury
of just a co-pay on their prescriptions, as many are also faced with highdeductibles as a result of certain employer provided health insurance plans
and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.141 Those with high out
of pocket costs and high deductibles still have to pay $300 for a set of two.142
For these consumers, the discounts PBMs are fighting for are not particularly
helpful, until they hit the high deductible.
B. MYLAN’S EPIPEN SAVINGS CARD
Mylan has attempted to soften the hefty bill its consumers face by
offering the “My EpiPen Savings Card,” which can allegedly be used to
reduce the amount of out-of-pocket expenses up to a maximum of $300 per
EpiPen 2-Pak.143 However, not everyone is eligible for these discounts. It is
clear, from the eligibility requirements, that those who will benefit the most
from these coupons are those who are commercially insured. Those with state
or federally funded plans through a government employer, or those enrolled
in Medicare, Medicaid, TriCare, or other military plans are ineligible for the
co-pay discount.144 One might wonder why Mylan did not just list those
whom the coupons are valid for, considering the list of those eligible is much
shorter.
136. See, e.g., Matthew Herper, The Insurance Rip-Off at the Heart of the EpiPen Scandal,
FORBES (Aug. 30, 2016, 8:43 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2016/08/30/theconsumer-rip-off-at-the-heart-of-the-epipen-scandal/2/#5115d8a77187 (Express Scripts and CVS
Caremark have market capitalizations of $46 billion and $99 billion respectively.).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. See, e.g., id.
142. See, e.g., Reality Checking Mylan CEO’s Testimony on EpiPen Prices, PUBLIC CITIZEN
(Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.citizen.org/documents/public-citizen-reality-check-on-mylan2016.pdf (“A problem made worse by the facts that many families purchase multiple sets of EpiPens
and that EpiPens must be replaced every year.”).
143. See My EpiPen Savings Card Terms and Conditions, EPIPEN, https://www.epipen.com/
copay-offer/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
144. Id.
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Mylan’s CEO, testifying before the U.S. House Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform, explained Mylan’s efforts to help consumers with
the use of these coupons: “We increased our My EpiPen Savings Card
program benefit for the brand product from $100 to $300 . . . we doubled the
eligibility of patients receiving free pens from $48,600 to $97,200 for a
family of four.”145 Still, when attempting to use these coupons, a large
percentage of Americans will face one of three problems. First, Mylan has
explicitly excluded patients with certain health plans from participating in its
savings card program. Second, the release of these coupons “trigger[s]
insurance companies to raise prices on consumers in other ways—for
example, in the form of higher premiums for everyone covered by the
plan.”146 Third, Mylan’s coupon program may only be temporary, as Mylan
planned to re-evaluate the program as of December 31, 2016.147 Thus, Mylan
may discontinue these benefits even for those who have private health
insurance and reaped the benefits of the coupon in 2016.
In sum, consumers are exposed to the high prices of the EpiPen product
even though Mylan has attempted to provide rebates to third-party plans to
make up for the lack of a cheaper, generic option.148 Mylan’s My Savings
Card coupons are only a “short-term answer” to its rising drug price.149
C. FED UP CONSUMERS
On August 23, 2016, a group of consumers who purchased the two-pack
of EpiPens for $600 filed a class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, because Mylan discontinued selling the product
individually.150 The complaint claims that the company violated multiple
state unfair trade practices and consumer protection statutes by forcing
people to buy the two-pack at $600 and not providing the opportunity to buy
just one.151 The plaintiffs also claim that Mylan used deceptive and/or
misleading representations, unconscionable commercial practices, deception,
and false pretenses regarding the purchase of the two-pack—which prevented
145. Reviewing the Price of EpiPens Hearing Before the United States H. of Rep. Comm. on
Oversight & Government Reform (2016) (testimony of Heather Bresch, CEO of Mylan
Pharmaceuticals), https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/2016-09-21-Mylan-CE
O-Bresch-Testimony.pdf.
146. Ginger Skinner, EpiPen Coupons Might Save You Money, If Your Insurance Accepts Them,
CONSUMER REPORTS (Sept. 2, 2016), http://www.consumerreports.org/drugs/epipen-couponsmight-save-you-money-if-your-insurance-accepts-them/.
147. See, e.g., id.
148. See, e.g., Herper, supra note 136.
149. See Skinner, supra note 146.
150. See, e.g., Ike Swetlitz, Mylan Faces Two Potential Class Action Lawsuits Over EpiPen
Pricing, STAT (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/09/06/epipen-mylan-lawsuits/;
Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 9, Johnson, et. Al. v. Mylan Specialty L.P.
and Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., 2-16-cv-13060-NGE-SDD (Aug. 23, 2016).
151. See Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 14–15, Johnson, et. Al. v. Mylan
Specialty L.P. and Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., 2-16-cv-13060-NGE-SDD (Aug. 23, 2016).
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patients and purchasers from being fully informed on the necessity, or lack
thereof, of purchasing two EpiPens.152
Another lawsuit was filed against the company in September of 2016 by
a Cincinnati resident, Linda Bates, in the Court of Common Pleas for
Hamilton County, Ohio.153 Bates claims that the company’s unconscionable
price hikes violate the state’s consumer protection law.154
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE HATCH-WAXMAN
PROBLEM
Legal precedent, class action lawsuits, and hefty settlements are effective
in bringing the weakness of the Act to light, but in order to prevent drug
manufacturers from continuing to monopolize the drug market, the Act must
be amended. New legislative committees are required to oversee the
enormous price hikes, and disingenuous tactics used by both brand-name and
generic manufacturers should be cautiously approached, if not forbidden. The
true purpose behind the Act is to benefit consumers, not pharmaceutical drug
companies. Though the Act looks to benefit consumers by streamlining the
generic drug application process, it nevertheless is and has always been about
providing consumers with safe and affordable health care options.
A. CREATION OF AN OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE
The creation of a federal oversight committee empowered to specifically
oversee drug price increases every year after an NDA is approved for the
market could work to combat inflated pharmaceutical prices. This committee
may set a cap on specific price hikes per year according to consumer needs,
Medicaid coverage, insurance costs, and the number of competing products
on the market. For example, if a situation arises, such as the one Mylan is in
currently, wherein there is the only one company with a brand-name and
generic product on the market, such committee may have prevented the price
hike, by limiting Mylan’s price increases over a yearly determined cap.155
The creation of such committee should be done within the confines of
the FDA’s regulation and rulemaking procedures,156 but would be most
efficient if contracted out to independent economic experts, drug innovators,
and medical experts working together to determine consumer need and
product availability within the pharmaceutical industry. This solution,
however, has one major flaw. Though the committee would work to lower
the cost of drugs, the costs of creating such committee, hiring experts, and

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See id. at 15.
See, e.g., Swetlitz, supra note 150.
See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 66.
Such as under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
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paying the salaries of committee members, would likely offset any savings
gained as a result of the lowering of drug prices.
An alternative, and perhaps a more cost-effective option for consumers,
would be if drug companies were required to set up their own independent
committees, in lieu of a government-run committee. Such a committee’s
main tasks within the company would be to study market fluctuations, gauge
the company’s price increases, and ensure that the company is in line with
the federal drug pricing oversight committee, if one were created. The board
of directors would select the committee members, and give the committee
specific quarterly tasks and proper procedures to fulfill such tasks.157 The
determinations and recommendations made by these committees may be
subject to the business judgment rule (varying by state),158 similar to that of
special litigation committees, which are set up by corporations in an attempt
to provide the company and its shareholders with a disinterested, independent
opinion on business decisions.159 This committee would work to sidestep the
consumer cost of creating a federal oversight committee and instead force the
companies to provide the public with accurate, up-to-date, and
understandable information about the prices of their drugs.
Corporate directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to their
shareholders, specifically the duty of loyalty and duty of care.160 Directors
are liable for acting contrary to these fiduciary duties and can be subject to a
derivative or direct suit brought by the company’s shareholders.161 Of course,
private entities, unlike the government, were not created by the people and
for the people and, in turn, owe little to the public. But pharmaceutical
companies, whose main purpose is to provide the public with effective and
affordable drugs, should be held accountable, as a matter of public policy,
when this purpose is actually a smokescreen for corporate greed.
Though these fiduciary duties serve to protect the corporation’s interests,
there is little incentive for corporations to protect consumers’ interests. To
force companies to take consumer needs and interests into account, in
addition to their own corporate interests, the proposed mandated internal
oversight committee’s duties should not be to the shareholders, but rather to
pharmaceutical drug consumers, specifically in the form of a duty of loyalty.
The members of the committee could be found liable for violating the newly
crafted FDA regulations on drug prices, acting in bad faith, or acting in
breach of their duty of loyalty to consumers. In theory, the creation of this
private right of action, similar to that of a derivative or direct suit, could be
157. See MELVIN EISENBERG & JAMES COX, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 232 (2014).
158. See generally Mary A. Lopatto, Hasan v. Clevetrust Realty Investors: The Business
Judgement Rule and Procedural Review of the Special Litigation Committee, 34 CATHOLIC UNIV.
L. REV. 791 (1985).
159. See, e.g., EISENBERG & COX, supra note 157, at 232.
160. See id. at 603–713.
161. Id.
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invoked if it were found that the corporation unduly influenced the committee
or acted in a self-interested way that hurt consumers.
An additional advantage of an internal oversight committee within
pharmaceutical drug companies, over a government regulatory system, is that
consumers would not bear these costs. Instead, companies would bear the
burden of proving their prices are reasonable, affordable, and legal, in light
of relevant economic factors, guidelines by the federal oversight committee,
and amendments to the Hatch-Waxman. Although this suggestion proposes
strict regulation of an enormous, free-market industry, the pharmaceutical
industry is in need of some limits on a company’s ability to manipulate the
market and continue to reap billions each year through rapid price increases
of their products without affording the consumers an alternative. If the United
States does not begin, or even attempt, to regulate drug pricing, consumers
will continue to foot the bill for any drugs that are in high demand.
B. AMENDING GENERIC EXCLUSIVITY PERIOD
The 180-day exclusivity period under Hatch-Waxman aids generic “first
fliers” in increasing profitability for a period of time. 162 However, this
exclusivity period is not actually entirely exclusive. It does not exclude the
brand-name company’s generic drug from also being on the market during
the 180 days.163 Although the Act’s “primary purpose was to decrease the
high cost of prescription drugs by increasing the availability of cheaper
generic versions while still encouraging new drug development,” this gap in
the Act undermines that purpose.164 This loophole adds another tool to the
brand name companies’ arsenal and creates a further hurdle for generics to
jump through.
The Act’s 180-day exclusivity period should be amended to exclude the
brand-name company from filing a generic ANDA or getting approval for a
previously filed ANDA during that time.165 Essentially, once the first flier is
approved, all other applications should be frozen in time for 180 days. Mylan,
which announced the launch of a generic EpiPen,166 is legally taking
advantage of this loophole and planning to bring in the profits from both the
brand-name EpiPen and the generic version, while the “only competing
device, Adrenaclick, has sold poorly. . . and many are unfamiliar with the
way Adrenaclick works.”167 This period should be exclusive of all generic
competition. In doing so, the market would not be dominated by the same
162. See, e.g., Henry Grabowski, Genia Long & Richard Mortimer, Recent Trends in BrandName and Generic Drug Competition, 17 J. MED. ECON. 2 (2013).
163. See, e.g., FTC Sues Endo Pharmaceuticals, supra note 26; Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012).
164. Brian Urevig, Hatch Waxman- Thoughtful Planning or Just Piling On: A Consideration of
the Federal Trade Commission’s Proposed Changes, 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 386, 391 (2003).
165. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
166. See First Generic, supra note 129.
167. Silverman, supra note 48.
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price-controlling company, but rather would allow the approved generic drug
true exclusivity for 180 days.
C. REVERSE PAYMENT PENALTY
In 2006, the FTC stated that, “[n]o matter what you call them, eliminating
these [reverse payment] deals is one of the Federal Trade Commission’s
highest priorities.”168 Aside from judicial holdings, however, no law has been
implemented or amended to outlaw these practices since the FTC made those
statements more than ten years ago. Since the “scope of the patent” test was
rejected in Actavis,169 there is no longer a concern that outlawing these
settlements would infringe on a patent holder’s right to protect its patent.
With specific regard to agreements such as Mylan and Teva’s settlement
in 2012, the Hatch-Waxman should be amended to require disclosure of
certain information.170 Though the agreements may contain confidential
information for both parties and the FTC is required to review such
agreements,171 information that is not pertinent to the companies’ businesses
should be disclosed. Such information should include the terms of the
agreement, the settlement amount, and the length of time, if any, the generic
company agrees to delay the launch of its product. If such information is
challenged as confidential, the FDA should be required to publish a press
release informing the public of the reasons for the settlement and the current
status of other pending drug applications with regard to the drug at issue. The
purpose behind this proposed disclosure rule is not to gain access to
pharmaceutical companies’ private records and business information, but
rather to have access to closed-door settlement information that works to
deprive consumers of cheaper drugs. The FDA, along with the FTC, should
be required to disclose detailed information, as permissible, regarding such
settlements to the public.
The Act should be amended to penalize reverse payments and disincentivize any interference with the application process of a generic product
or the implementation of the 180-day exclusivity period for a generic product.
D. NEW REQUIREMENT FOR 505(Q) CITIZEN PETITIONS
Mylan’s submission of an eleventh hour citizen petition seems highly
suspect since it was potentially in competition with Teva at the time.172
However, if pharmaceutical companies were prevented from submitting their
own medical studies to the FDA while the FDA is in the process of approving
or rejecting products, it would place a heavy burden on the FDA to actually
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

LEIBOWITZ, supra note 53, at 1.
Fed. Trade Comm’n. v. Actavis, Inc., et. al.,133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
See Epinephrine Auto-Injector Settlement, supra note 49.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r–8(b)(3)(D) (2012).
See generally Mylan-Citizen Petition, supra note 49.

2017]

Abuse of The Hatch-Waxman Act

613

conduct these studies themselves.173 In addition, the APA requires that the
public, including competing pharmaceutical companies, be granted the
opportunity to bring legitimate concerns about a drug before the FDA.174
However, allowing a singular company to test and reject a drug is essentially
granting them the powers that Congress has delegated to the FDA. Statistical
information shows that these petitions are rarely, if ever, actually granted by
the FDA.175 Instead, it simply delays the FDA’s process of reviewing a drug
by forcing the FDA to review and reject a likely invalid and scientifically
flawed 505(q) citizen petition, before it approves or rejects a competing
generic’s ANDA.176
To prevent the submission of 505(q) citizen petitions for the sole purpose
of delaying the FDA’s review process, the petitioning brand-name company
should be required to send the citizen petition to the generic company that
filed the ANDA before submission to the FDA, and notify the FDA of the
date on which this petition process was initiated. Generic companies then
have the opportunity to reply to the petition and/or conduct an alternate study
to invalidate the petition, which would then be sent back to the brand-name
company. The supplemented 505(q) citizen petition would then be sent to the
FDA. Though on its face, this presents the FDA with more paperwork to
review, forcing both companies to produce a more thorough, scientific
analysis can prevent the filing of eleventh hour petitions and provide the FDA
with more comprehensive information with which to evaluate the NDA.
To avoid abuse of this pre-petition rule and prevent companies from
forcing discussion to delay implementation, the Act should limit these
petitions to 20-pages and implement temporal limits within which to review
and respond to the citizen petition. Since the FDA would no longer be the
first entity to probe the lengthy document (for under the new rule, both
companies would have reviewed and responded to the petition prior to the
FDA assessing it) the FDA’s role during the pre-petition process would be to
monitor such activity and ensure that the petition is filed in accordance with
the page and temporal restrictions.
Lastly, the filing of bad faith eleventh hour petitions should be penalized.
In 2015, the FDA denied 100% of 505(q) citizen petitions filed within six
months of the expiration of brand-name patents.177 If the vast majority of
eleventh hour citizen petitions are being dismissed for lack of validity and
credibility,178 then why are these petitioners not penalized for their bad faith
filing? Hatch-Waxman should completely outlaw any attempt by a
173. See, e.g., Sydney Lupkin, FDA Fees on Industry Haven’t Fixed Delays In Generic Drug
Approvals, NPR (Sep. 1, 2016, 2:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/09/01/492
235796/fda-fees-on-industry-havent-fixed-delays-in-generic-drug-approvals.
174. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e).
175. See Carrier & Minniti, supra note 82, at 336.
176. Id. at 351.
177. See id. at 333.
178. Id. at 341.
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competing company to purposely delay the FDA’s ANDA review process. In
turn, the Act should grant a private right of action to any company that was
hindered or harmed by a bad faith petition, in addition to granting the FDA
the discretion to prosecute as it sees fit.
E. CLASSIFICATION OF DRUGS
The importance of valid drug classification is now apparent to Mylan,
after its recent $465 million settlement for misclassifying the EpiPen as a
generic drug to the Medicaid Program.179 The Hatch-Waxman Act, intended
to get more generic drugs to the market at a faster rate, can prevent this
misclassification by requiring the FDA to notify the Medicaid Program and
other government entities involved in the food and drug industry of the proper
classification of drugs. The opportunity to “misclassify” seemed too
appealing to Mylan and will continue to allow companies to dupe
government entities throughout the country.
CONCLUSION
There should be no room for drug companies to mislead the government,
other pharmaceutical manufacturers, or consumers, for, as we have seen, drug
companies will soon find new, creative, and legal strategy to cement their
monopolization over the relevant market. Some pharmaceutical companies,
such as Mylan, have been able to dominate their market and increase the price
of their product, all within the confines of the Hatch-Waxman Act. To tighten
its hold on the market, Mylan has filed eleventh hour citizen petitions with
the FDA, engaged in pay-for-delay settlements with generic manufacturers,
and misclassified its drug to the Medicaid Program. Other drug
manufacturers have also engaged in product hopping, which essentially
coerces patients to continue to use the brand-name company’s products.
Without any oversight, these practices will continue to deny consumers
affordable options for medication.
This Note calls for amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act, such as
mandatory reverse payment settlement disclosures, a well-regulated citizen
petition process, and the handing over of drug classification responsibilities
from drug companies to the FDA. These proposed amendments are fully
within the spirit of what the Act was truly meant to do: provide consumers
with greater consumer access to low-cost, quality medication.
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